This article investigates the temporal trend in the socioeconomic differentials between ethnic minorities and the Han majority in China. Data from a series of population censuses and a mini-census show that, while the regional distribution of ethnic minorities remained relatively stable from 1982 to 2005, occupational segregation and educational disparities between minorities and the Han increased over time. Multivariate analysis of data from the 2005 mini-census further reveals that ethnic minorities were disadvantaged in earnings in urban labor markets compared to the Han, especially those minorities in the private sector and in self-employment. The analysis also uncovers substantial heterogeneity among ethnic minorities in their socioeconomic relationship with the Han and presents a comprehensive picture of how various ethnic minorities have fared in the course of China's economic transition.
Introduction
China is a multi-ethnic nation consisting of 56 groups-the Han and 55 minorities.
1 These 55 ethnic minorities combined account for less than 10% of the national population, yet they are scattered all over the vast territory. Still they are mainly concentrated in the northwestern and southwestern regions, with each inhabiting certain areas. Historically, Chinese ethnic minorities have trailed the Han in terms of a variety of socioeconomic measures. 2 In the early 1950s the newly established communist government began identifying minorities and implemented various policies to protect their socioeconomic rights and to promote ethnic egalitarianism and national unity. 3 To what extents have these efforts been successful in reducing socioeconomic disparities between ethnic minorities and the Han majority in China? In particular, how have ethnic minorities fared amid China's dramatic economic and social changes over the past three decades? The booming research on social stratification in the course of China's economic transition has largely ignored the ethnic dimension 1 These groups are literally called 'nationalities' or minzu in Chinese. To be identified as a nationality, the group has to meet four criteria, articulated by Joseph Stalin: common language, common territory, common economic life and common culture. See Elena Barabantseva, 'From the language of class to the rhetoric of development: discourses of "nationality" and "ethnicity" of inequality. With a few exceptions, 4 the literature on Chinese ethnic minorities is focused on analyzing specific groups pertaining to their social histories and identifications, marriage norms and patterns, religious and cultural orientations, linguistic practices, etc. 5 These ethnological studies have in general adopted diverse concepts and methodologies, rendering the findings for various groups not directly comparable. Large-scale quantitative analyses are especially limited, because data on minority groups of heterogeneous compositions are difficult to gather. Because of political sensitivity, it was not until recently that population-based sample surveys were conducted in China specifically targeting ethnic minorities. 6 Even so, these surveys often covered an insufficient number of individuals in each minority group, making it impossible to comprehensively compare a specific ethnic minority with the Han group. 7 The nationwide population censuses do cover a large enough sample but often lack key information on labor market outcomes for analysis. 8 The massive riots in Xinjiang in recent years have stimulated social scientists' research interests in ethnic relations in China. In addition to political and religious issues, 9 some researchers argue that the riots had their roots in the social and economic relations of Uyghur people with Han Chinese. The Uyghurs strongly felt left behind, as increasing opportunities in China's booming economy have been disproportionately taken by Han locals and migrants. Empirical analyses based on a sample of the 2005 mini-census data have lent some support to this speculation, 10 thus providing a sociological explanation for escalating ethnic tensions in the region. However, the analyses are limited to Xinjiang only, and to the contrast between the Uyghur and Han groups in earnings inequality across employment sectors. To better understand the profound social impacts of China's economic transitions on ethnic relations, a systematic examination of the dyadic socioeconomic relationships of other minorities with the Han people in a specific regional context is thus called for.
This article aims to provide a comprehensive overview of ethnic social stratification during China's economic transition. By analyzing data from a series of Chinese population censuses from 1982 to 2000 and the mini-census in 2005, it first charts the trends in geographic distribution, and educational and occupational attainment of 18 minority groups whose populations exceed one million and of the Han over time. The article then investigates empirically the labor market outcomes of ethnic minorities treated as a whole and as individual groups, by capitalizing on a large sample from the 2005 population 4 Poston and Shu, 'The demographic and socioeconomic composition of China's ethnic minorities'; Emily Hannum and yu Xie, 'Ethnic stratification in northwest China: occupational difference between Han Chinese and national minorities in Xinjiang, 1982 Xinjiang, -1990 mini-census with detailed information on labor market outcomes. Given the lack of longitudinal data on earnings, the authors approximate the changes over time by the variations across employment sectors to assess how the market reform in China has affected ethnic inequality. Finally, the implications of these findings are discussed and future directions for the study of ethnic relations in China are suggested.
The Fate of Ethnic Minorities in China's Economic Reform and Regional Development
According to China's 2010 population census, the 55 non-Han minorities had a combined population of 111,966,349, accounting for 8.4% of the national total. 11 As shown in Table 1 , the minority population grew at a much faster pace than the Han population. From 1982 to 2010, whereas the Han population increased by 32.76%, the minority population rose by 66.52%. This is largely because minorities of lower socioeconomic status, except for Koreans and Zhuang, tend to have higher fertility rates and the enforcement of the one-child policy is much more lenient toward them; the ethnic reclassification has also contributed to the dramatic growth in the population of certain minority groups (e.g. Manchus and Tujia). As a matter of fact, the number of ethnic minority groups with populations exceeding one million increased from 15 in 1982 to 18 in 2010, and these groups constituted more than 93% of the Chinese minority population.
Most minorities occupy their own compact territory and thus are spatially isolated from one another, except for a certain amount of interaction with the Han majority. Figure 1 plots the geographic distribution of 18 minorities with at least 10% of them living in certain prefecture in the prefectural population, which largely correspond to China's ethnic autonomous areas. According to the first Constitution in 1954, regional autonomy could be established in areas where an ethnic minority lives in a compact community. The administrative head of government of each autonomous area, by law, must be a member of that area's specified ethnic group, whereas the party secretary, who essentially controls the power of jurisdiction, is usually Han Chinese. The laws also allow limited autonomy in finance, economic planning, arts, science and cultural policies, and in the organization of the local police. In 1980, Hu yaobang-then General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party-began introducing a series of socioeconomic policies that favored minorities with respect to family planning, college admission, job recruitment and promotions, and representation in legislative and other government bodies.
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Notwithstanding these efforts, minorities continued to lag behind the Han in socioeconomic attainment, a problem largely attributable to the geographic distribution of ethnic groups and regional disparities in development, especially in the 1990s. Indeed, China's phenomenal economic growth has been accompanied by uneven development between the rural and urban areas and between the coastal and inland regions.
14 The urban-rural ratio of income per capita increased dramatically from 2.5 in 1990 to 3. was attributed to the urban-rural income inequality. 15 A similar trend can be observed across regions.
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The uneven regional economic development further differentiated local governments' capacity for funding education. In many poor rural areas in the central and western regions, local governments have a tough time raising sufficient revenue to cover teachers' salaries, not to mention other noninstructive costs. 17 This has resulted in the substantial disparities in per-student educational expenditure across areas and regions. 18 Furthermore, the uneven regional development has triggered a large-scale internal migration, especially from inland to coastal provinces, for better economic opportunities since the early 1990s. 19 Even though institutional barriers and social exclusions associated with the hukou system continue to deny the migrant population local (urban) permanent residency, these migrants have achieved economic and social mobility compared to the farming life they have left behind in their home villages.
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Ethnic socioeconomic stratification in China was further complicated by the changing regional inequality and labor migration. First, the growing regional and rural-urban disparities may have placed ethnic minorities, who mainly reside in remote western rural areas, into even more disadvantaged positions relative to the Han. Second, it is mostly the Han living in the ethnic areas who migrate to coastal areas for better economic opportunities, because minorities tend to encounter cultural and linguistic hurdles when they decide to migrate elsewhere. 21 Furthermore, while government strategies designed to develop western regions have been intended to bring economic prosperity to minorities in those regions, 22 the policies seem to have failed to deliver. 23 Instead, the influxes of Han migrants into the border regions and their subsequent direct competition with ethnic minorities have aggravated ethnic conflicts in regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet. 24 Last but not least, the implementation of preferential policies towards ethnic minorities in nonfarm sectors has also encountered serious challenges in the course of China's further marketization and decentralization. The socialist redistributive hierarchy that used to effectively carry out administrative commands to promote ethnic equality had been undermined to a large extent as the economic reform proceeded. 25 The profit-driven private firms naturally placed more emphasis on economic efficiency than social equity; even state firms had been increasingly allowed to adopt market practices in recruiting, rewarding and dismissing workers. 26 Uncertain about a job candidate's skills and potential productivity, employers may base their hiring decision on visible features, such as ethnicity or gender, resulting in labor market discrimination. Without appropriate regulations, discriminations against ethnic minorities may have become more rampant than before in urban China's labor markets. 27 Hence, the dramatic economic and social changes in China over the past decades may have placed ethnic minorities into even more disadvantaged positions, an issue that few studies have addressed. As a benchmark analysis, Poston and Shu's work on the demographic and socioeconomic compositions of Chinese ethnic minorities provided little information on temporal changes because they employed data from the 1982 census only. 28 31 Their results may be attributable to the fact that the samples were drawn from only nine provinces, and thus were not representative of the whole country or of ethnic minorities. In the analyses of household survey data, ethnic minorities are typically treated as a single group and the heterogeneity among minorities is largely neglected. This article attempts to remedy these problems and provide an updated and systematic examination of ethnic stratification, in particular, whether ethnic minorities are losers or winners in the context of China's rapid economic growth, uneven regional development, and further marketization since the 1990s.
Data, Variables and Methods
The data analyzed here are extracted from a series of Chinese population censuses in 1982, 1990, 2000 and the mini-census in 2005. These censuses provide information on individuals' ethnicity, education and occupation (for those aged 15 and above). As mentioned earlier, population censuses with large samples can provide an indispensable source of information to study social ethnic issues in China, especially in relation to geographic distributions, education and occupation for each of the 55 minority groups.
The Chinese population censuses lack information on labor market outcomes which are crucial to this investigation. The mini-census in 2005, for the first time, collected information on respondents' earnings, employment status, occupation (two-digit code), work unit sector, working hours and fringe benefits, in addition to hukou status, place of hukou registration, current place of residence, education and other demographic characteristics that are also available in the 2000 census. 32 The mini-census in 2005, combining the advantages of both the censuses (large sample size) and the surveys (relatively detailed information), is ideally suited to the investigation of labor market stratification between ethnic minorities and Han Chinese. 33 The authors analyze a large subsample of the mini-census data (N=1,539,798), with 168,301 being minorities. About half of the subsample were employed on a full-time basis in the nonagricultural sectors at the time of the survey (N=727,416), including 41,608 ethnic minorities.
Because the classification of education varies across censuses/mini-census, education is grouped into four levels: 1=primary school or below; 2=junior high school; 3=senior high school or equivalent; and 4=college or above. Following the census tabulation data, occupations are coded into six broad 26 Zang, 'Affirmative action, economic reforms, and Uyghur-Han variation in job attainment in Ürümchi' . categories: 1=managers; 2=professionals; 3=office clerical staff; 4=sales and service workers; 5=produc-tion workers; and 6=farmers. Based on the micro-data with detailed address information, the authors employ a fine-tuned spatial unit-the prefecture-to examine minority-Han disparities in specific local contexts.
The key dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly earnings, calculated as all work-related income but not nonworking income such as property income and transferred income. 34 In Chinese population censuses, each ethnic group is assigned a standard code (see examples in Table 1 ). Ethnicity is recoded both as a single dummy variable (minority vs. Han) and as 19 dummy variables (18 minority groups in Table 1 , plus the 'others' group consisting of the remaining 37 minority groups). The employment sector is coded into four nonagricultural categories, in addition to the agricultural sector: government/public institutions, public enterprises, private enterprises and the selfemployed. other independent variables include education, gender, experience, hukou status, weekly work hours, occupation and prefecture. 35 This article first documents the temporal trend from 1982 to 2005 in regional distribution, educational disparities and occupational segregation between minority groups and the Han, by computing the index of dissimilarity (ID)-a demographic measure of how evenly two groups are distributed across categories 36 -and then focusing on analyzing data from the mini-census of 2005 to examine the Han-minority earnings disparities in nonagricultural sectors. To investigate the ethnic earnings inequality among the nonagricultural labor forces, linear regression models with multivariate controls are employed. To reveal the heterogeneity among ethnic minorities in terms of their socioeconomic development, each of the 18 ethnic minority groups is also compared with the Han.
The ultimate goal of this article is to understand the dynamics of ethnic inequality since the start of China's economic reform. Due to the lack of available longitudinal data, the variations in minority-Han earnings differentials across the four nonagricultural employment sectors are used as a proxy of over-time change. These sectors constitute a continuum representing the decline in state protection of ethnic minorities in labor markets. 37 The sectoral difference thus can be used to gauge the impact of market transition on the socioeconomic attainment of ethnic minorities in China. 34 Given the fact that income is more sensitive than other social/demographic information conventionally collected in censuses, the authors check the average annual income in the mini-census against comparable urban surveys conducted in the period around 2005 by either universities or the National Bureau of Statistics. results are largely consistent.
35 education is measured in four levels as in other censuses. Gender is coded as a dummy variable (male=1) as is hukou status (rural=1). respondents' work experience is calculated by subtracting 18 from the reported age and also adding a squared term to capture the curvilinear relationship between work experience and earnings. Weekly working hours (as a continuous measure) and occupation and prefecture (as a set of dummies) are included in the regression models as control variables.
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To compute the index of dissimilarity, the formula is written as:
where m j = the ethnic minority population in the jth category (province/prefecture, education and occupation), M = the total ethnic minority population in the sample, h j = the Han population in the jth category, H = the total Han population in the sample, and k = the total number of categories. ranging from 0 to 100, ID has been used extensively as a measure of inequality in studies of social stratification. In the context here, ID represents the minimum proportion of individuals of either a specific minority group or the Han group that would have to shift to a different category in order to produce an even distribution (in either region, or education, or occupation) between the two groups. 
Results

Ethnic Disparities in Geographic Distribution, and Educational and Occupational Attainment
Previous research has shown that ethnic socioeconomic differentials can be explained largely by regional inequality. 38 The provincial segregation index (vs. the Han) is computed for all minority groups as a whole as well as for each of the 18 minority groups.
As shown in Table 2 , there is a slight increase in the segregation index from 1982 to 1990, followed by a decline from 68.02% in 1990 to 58.12% in 2005. In other words, 68.02% of minorities in 1990 would have to be shifted to a different province in order to produce a balanced geographic distribution with the Han majority. The figure dropped to 58.12% in 2005. The drop was likely due to inter-provincial migration involving initially the outmigration of the Han from the western regions, followed by the outmigration of some ethnic minorities. on the other hand, Han migrants may also have moved to the western border regions inhabited by minorities for better economic opportunities (for example, Xinjiang).
Not surprisingly, such a temporal pattern varied by minority group. While some groups (e.g. Mongols, Zhuang, Bouyei and Koreans) showed a monotonic trend in spatial integration with the Han population, others remained segregated from the Han over the decades. Some groups became even more segregated, perhaps because more Han people in the ethnic regions had migrated out. 39 The Hui people were the most geographically dispersed minority groups, with their segregation index remaining the lowest among all minority groups from 1982 to 2005. The Uyghurs, who mainly resided in Xinjiang, on the other hand, appeared to be the most segregated minority in China, with a dissimilarity index of 99.33% in 1982 and 98.47% in 2005. The ID of Tibetans, who were dispersed in several provinces in southwestern China (Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan and yunnan), increased from 85.05% in 1982 to 87.03% in 2005.
As Figure 1 shows, most ethnic minorities were indeed concentrated in a certain prefecture or county within a province. The ID value could be affected by the level of geographic units in the calculation. In Table 2 , ID is calculated at the prefectural level for 1982, 1990 and 2005 (in parentheses).
40 results show that, while the segregation in general was higher at the prefectural level than at the provincial level, the temporal trends described above were largely the same. In a modern society, education is the main basis of social stratification. The authors compare the disparity between ethnic minorities and the Han in terms of their educational attainment from 1982 to 2005, and calculate the ID in Table 3 (left panel) for all 18 minorities as a group, and for each of the 18 minorities. The temporal trends in the pattern of educational disparities became even more evident, increasing from 8.83 in 1982 to 19.68 in 2005. Even though the ID per se does not indicate which group is advantaged or disadvantaged, the knowledge of ethnic stratification in China suggests that, with a few exceptions (e.g. Koreans), minorities in general were lagging behind the Han in educational attainment. Educational expansion over the past three decades seems to have benefited the Han more than ethnic minorities, because of the uneven development of regional economies in China. 41 The authors further investigate the ethnic disparities in occupational attainment from 1982 to 2005, and present the ID of occupational distribution in the right panel of Table 3 . results show that, the occupational segregation was very low in 1982, since the majority of the Chinese worked in agriculture at that time, regardless of whether they were Han or minorities. over time, the ID for all minorities increased monotonically from 3.59% in 1982, to 4.66% in 1990, to 16.12% in 2000, and then to 23.81% in 2005. This pattern holds consistently for most of the 18 minority groups under study.
Two factors may account for the temporal trend. First, the increasing educational disparities may lead to a changing occupational distribution between minorities and the Han. Second, China's economic miracle since the reform has been accompanied by a transformation from the agriculture-dominated occupational structure to the manufacturing-and service-dominated structure in the labor markets, as well as labor migration from inland villages to coastal cities. In these processes, the Han people are much more likely than minorities to move to cities and take up a variety of nonagricultural occupations that have become newly available. In other words, the urbanization and migration patterns differ by ethnic group, resulting in increasing occupational segregation over time. 42 The findings above offer a glimpse into how minorities have fared in educational and occupational attainment relative to the Han majority in the context of China's uneven regional development. As known, differentials in education and occupation lead to earnings inequality in the labor markets. The 
Ethnic Earnings Inequality: Evidence from the 2005 Mini-Census
The mini-census in 2005, with its large sample size and comprehensive coverage of all regions in China, provides a unique source of information allowing a thoughtful research design to address the research questions in this article. 43 Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables included in this analysis of the mini-census data. To show the ethnic difference in these characteristics, the descriptive statistics for the Han and minorities are shown separately. The left panel is for the full sample, whereas the right panel is for the urban nonagricultural sample only (full-time employment).
As results in the left panel of Table 4 show, out of all 1,539,798 respondents, 1,371,497 (89.1%) were Han while 168,301 (10.9%) were minorities. Confirming the patterns previously found in Table 3 , ethnic minorities were less educated, mainly concentrated in agricultural and self-employment sectors, and earned less than the Han Chinese. To give an example, among the Han Chinese, 25.14% (15.64+9.5) received senior high school education or above; 46.1% worked in the agricultural sector and 46.78% were farmers, although 72.28% held rural hukou status. In contrast, among ethnic minorities, 14.36% (8.33+6.03) received senior high school education or above; 70.39% worked in agriculture and 71.78% were farmers. Notably, 84.98% of minorities held rural hukou status. Therefore, Han people were more likely than minorities to be engaged in nonagricultural occupations, leading to a huge difference in 43 Wu and he, 'the evolution of population census undertaking in China, 1953-2010' . Table 4 shows that 727,416 individuals in the nonagricultural sector are of interest. The ethnic disparities seem to be minimum, or even reversed in this sector, perhaps because of the long-standing favorable policies towards ethnic minorities adopted by the Chinese government. Minorities did quite well in educational and occupational attainments: 23.04% attended college (vs.18.51% for the Han); 24.94% worked in government/institutions (vs. 14.47% for the Han); 3.90% were managers and 21.04% were professionals (vs. 3.77% and 15.41%, respectively, for the Han). While minorities were still disadvantaged in monthly earnings, the gap was much smaller in the nonagricultural sector than in the full sample.
In Table 5 , the authors further investigate earnings inequality between ethnic minorities and the Han in multivariate linear regression models. The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly earnings. In Model 1, ethnic minorities are included as a dummy variable only. Consistent with the results presented in Table 4 , ethnic minorities earned 14.1% (e −0.152 -1) less than the Han, and the difference is statistically significant (p<0.001). In Model 2, education, experience and its squared term, gender, hukou status and weekly working hours are added as control variables. While all these individual attributes have significant effects on earnings as expected, the ethnic earnings gap persists and is even slightly enlarged: ethnic minorities earned 15.5% (e −0.168 -1) less than the Han, holding constant the other individual characteristics.
In Model 3 of Table 5 , employment sector and occupation are further introduced as a set of dummy variables and reveal significant variations among workers in different employment sectors: those who worked in public or private enterprises or who were self-employed all enjoyed net earnings advantages of 11.7% (e than the Han. Nevertheless, after further controlling for the effect of prefecture in Model 4, the sectoral variation is reduced to a negligible level, and the ethnic earnings inequality almost disappears. other things being equal, ethnic minorities now earned only 4.3% (e −0.044 -1) less than their Han counterparts, and the difference is still statistically significant (p<0.001). Therefore, the results provide further evidence showing that ethnic stratification in China was largely associated with the regional uneven socioeconomic development.
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As noted from Tables 2 and 3 above, there was substantial heterogeneity among Chinese ethnic minorities. In Table 6 , Models 2-4 of Table 5 are replicated but compared among the 18 large minority groups, with an additional category 'others' consisting of the remaining 37 minority groups. In general, ethnic minorities were disadvantaged in earnings in China-but only for some minorities. As results 44 yu Xie and Emily Hannum, 'regional variation in earnings inequality in reform-era China' , American Journal of Sociology 101, (1996), pp. 950-992; Xie and Wu, 'Danwei profitability and earnings inequality in urban China' . -1) over the Han; Mongols, Bai, Hui and Dai did not differ significantly from the Han in earnings, whereas the remaining 12 minority groups earned much less than their Han counterparts.
The divergent pattern of ethnic stratification is even more evident in Figure 2 , in which the adjusted mean difference in the logarithm of monthly earnings between each of the minority groups and the Han majority are plotted (Model 4). Uyghurs and the Kazaks, who resided mainly in Xinjiang, performed the worst among all minorities, followed by Hani, yao, Dong, Li, Zhuang, Bouyei, Miao, Tibetans, yi and Tujia. other things being equal, the Uyghurs earned 18.5% (e −0.205 -1) and the Kazaks earned 15.5% (e 0.168 -1) less than their Han counterparts. Koreans, on the other hand, stood out and enjoyed significant advantages in earnings. Note that since prefecture dummies are included in Model 4, regional variations are ruled out and essentially each minority is compared to the Han in their local (prefecture) labor markets.
This article is primarily concerned with how ethnic minorities have fared in the course of China's rapid social and economic transition. 45 As mentioned earlier, the changes over time are approximated by variations in ethnic inequalities across employment sectors (government/public institutions, public enterprises, private enterprises and self-employment). In Table 7 , regression models on the logarithm of earnings are run separately for each sector, first with ethnic minority as a dummy variable, and then with a set of dummy variables for the 19 ethnic groups (with the Han as the reference group). In two sets of analyses, education, experience and its squared term, gender, hukou status, work hours, occupation and prefecture dummies are controlled. To conserve space, the coefficients of these variables are not presented here.
The four sectors constitute a continuum with government/public institutions on the one end and self-employment on the other end, representing the declining influence of the state and the increasing influence of market forces in labor markets. As expected, the minority-Han earnings disparity was larger in sectors that saw declining state protection of minorities. other things being equal, ethnic minorities earned 1.59% (e Han Chinese. All these coefficients are statistically significant (p<0.01). 46 Figure 3 plots the earnings of minority relative to Han locals (equal to 1) across the four sectors.
Unlike the findings reported for a specific region such as Xinjiang, 47 none of the earnings gaps in the four sectors seem substantial in this study. This finding is probably due to the fact that the notable disadvantages of certain ethnic groups can be offset by the better standings of other minorities relative to the Han. To further discern the patterns, the ethnic minorities are disaggregated into the 19 groups (18 major ethnic groups and one residual group) and the authors replicate the analyses above. Consistent with the results in Table 6 , there were huge variations among minorities in terms of their socioeconomic relations with the Han across the four employment sectors. Within the sector of government/public institutions, two of the 18 minority groups (Koreans and Tibetans) earned significantly more than the Han; nine of them (Mongols, Hui, Uyghur, Bouyi, Manchus, Dong, Bai, Kazaks and Dai) did not differ from the Han in earnings, and the remaining seven earned slightly less than the Han. The pattern applies also to the sector of public enterprises (with the exception of Uyghurs). Ethnic egalitarianism seems to have remained effective mainly in government/public institutions and in public enterprises after decades of economic reform. Those minorities in private enterprises and in self-employment, where 46 Further tests show that the differences among coefficients across equations (sectors) are highly significant (p<0.001).
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Wu and Song, 'ethnic stratification amid China's economic transition' . the enforcement of state ethnic policies tended to be weaker, were responsible for the majority of the disadvantages facing minorities as a group.
Summary, Conclusion and Discussion
This article analyzed the data from a series of population censuses/mini-census to examine the temporal trend in socioeconomic differentials between ethnic minorities and the Han in China. Specifically, it compared 18 minority groups, each with a population of at least one million, to Han Chinese in terms of their geographic distribution, educational and occupational attainment, and earnings over the past decades. This analysis revealed that, while the regional distribution of ethnic minorities remained relatively stable, occupational segregation and educational disparities between minorities and the Han at the national level, measured by the index of dissimilarity, have increased over time since 1982. The authors speculate that these patterns are closely associated with the uneven development in educational investment, population migration and economic transformation across regions during the same period. These findings help understand the labor market inequality between ethnic minorities and the Han in the course of China's social and economic transitions. The article then analyzed the 2005 mini-census data to examine ethnic earnings inequality among the nonagricultural working population. Multivariate analyses revealed that ethnic minorities were disadvantaged in earnings compared to the Han, even after controlling for the effect of prefectures: the gaps were smallest among those in government/public institutions, larger among those in public enterprises and private enterprises, and the largest among the self-employed. Four sectors are used as a continuum to represent the decline in the influence of the state and the increase in market forces in ethnic socioeconomic stratification. It is concluded that, in general, the dramatic economic and social changes in China over the past three decades have placed Chinese ethnic minorities into even more disadvantaged positions in the labor markets than before.
Chinese ethnic minorities were by no means homogeneous. There is great heterogeneity within each of the 18 minority groups under study with respect to their socioeconomic relationship with the Han. Some were more integrated than others with the Han population and fared better than the Han economically and the marketization seemed to have given them more competitive advantages (e.g. Koreans). others showed no difference from the Han once regional factors and social and demographic characteristics were taken into account (e.g. Mongols, Hui, Manchus, Bai, and Dai). Still others were disadvantaged to varying degrees compared to the Han, and their situations seemed to have worsened in the course of China's rapid economic transitions (e.g. Uyghurs and Kazaks).
Inequality among various ethnic groups in China has received increasing attention from both social science researchers and the public after recent massive riots in Tibet (in March 2008) and Xinjiang (in July 2009) as well as the spate of attacks elsewhere in connection with Uyghurs afterwards. Some commentators argue that the ethnic tension and conflicts in China's border regions were not incidental, but rather rooted in their poor social and economic relations with Han Chinese. 48 The analyses of Chinese ethnic social stratification in this article enable a better understanding of the Uyghurs' situations in Xinjiang in a broad and comparative perspective. Indeed, while the Uyghurs were not the worst performers in terms of educational and occupational attainment among all ethnic minorities in this article, they were the most disadvantaged in earnings in urban labor markets. The fact that the increasing economic opportunities created by the booming economy have been disproportionately taken advantage of by Han Chinese only serves to frustrate the Uyghurs. 49 A primary interest of the present research is to investigate how ethnic minorities have fared in the course of China's rapid social and economic transition. The temporal trends are approximated by variations across four sectors-government/public institutions, public enterprises, private enterprises and self-employment-representing the decrease in state protection and increase in market forces in shaping ethnic stratification. The Chinese socialist state has long played a visible and direct role in promoting ethnic egalitarianism. As the reform proceeded and the redistributive state gradually retreated from the economic sphere to give way to a competitive labor market, those who used to be under the protection of the state egalitarian policies (e.g. ethnic minorities in this case) tend to lose out and face greater disadvantages in the labor markets. After three decades of market reform, overall ethnic earnings disparities continue to remain small in magnitude, albeit growing in economic sectors more exposed to market competition.
In light of rising ethnic unrests in certain regions, some scholars have cast doubt on Chinese government policies towards ethnic minorities in general. 50 This analysis has shown that the socioeconomic relations of minorities with the Han vary substantially from one group to another. This is likely a result of their unique history and culture, or structural integration with the Han population, 51 but problems in government policies towards specific regions and ethnic minorities could also be contributing to the differential relations. In this regard, sociologists have conducted much work-both theoretically and empirically-on issues related to ethnicity, immigration and assimilation in other social contexts over the past few decades. 52 Future research devoted to understanding specific mechanisms through which various patterns of ethnic stratification emerge in the new era in China will benefit from the availability of suitable data to be collected for the purposes.
